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Chapter 14
An Actuarial Perspective on How Social
Security Reform Could Influence
Employer-Sponsored Pensions
Christopher Bone
The U.S. retirement income system has often been described as a three-
legged stool, with the three supports of the stools being social security,
employer-sponsored retirement plans, and individual savings. In this anal-
ogy, significant changes in the length or strength ofone leg of the stool may
require changes in the other legs. Yet, to date, actuarial analysis of proposed
social security reforms have focused primarily on how the proposed changes
would affect the social security program as a stand-alone entity.! This chap-
ter reviews the actuarial implications ofsocial security reform for the second
leg of the stool- retirement plans sponsored by employers.
We approach this topic by focusing on two areas where actuaries typically
are called to assist plan sponsors in determining plan design. These are the
pension expense that employers will recognize as a result of a particular
plan design, and the lifetime pension benefit of retired former employees
expressed in terms of replacement of pre-retirement disposable income
(the benefit planning function). To address these issues, we begin by cate-
gorizing plans by sponsor and benefit design type. These categories are used
as a framework for evaluating the pension expense an employer may incur
and the types of benefit changes that might occur under a range ofdifferent
social security reforms. This allows preliminary analysis of the speed and
direction of employer responses to different social security reform alter-
natives. Such analysis may permit policymakers to begin to review the ef-
fects of social security reform proposals on the combined government and
employer-provided retirement security system.
Key Items ofActuarial Analysis
Most employer-sponsored retirement plans are designed around the con-
cept of replacing pre-retirement income in retirement (Allen et al. 1988).
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Given the amount of income replacement provided by social security to
certain groups of employees, most plan sponsors therefore, implicitly or
explicitly, consider the level and timing of social security benefits in design-
ing retirement benefit plans. For a sponsor of a retirement program that
supplements social security, key actuarial implications of social security re-
form will be the cost to the sponsor of the revisions to social security and the
effect of changes on the behavior of plan participants. Cost to the sponsor
may arise in several areas, for example, as payroll taxes or in the cost of the
sponsor's plan. Cost issues of primary concern are:
Who pays - employees through payrOll taxes or a broader group through
use of income tax revenues?
How much are the costs/ savings to the plan sponsor?
When do costs increase/ decrease?
Is the cost recorded at a different time than the cash flow?
Anticipated behavioral changes will be evaluated by plan sponsors in
terms of the interaction of projected workforce requirements with changes
in individual incentives to work. Many plan sponsors design plans to accom-
plish certain workforce management goals. To continue to achieve these
goals, "designed" plans may require modification in different ways as a
result of behavioral effects of a particular proposed reform.
Categorizing Plans and Sponsors by Benefit Design
Philosophy and Sponsor TYpe
In evaluating the differential impact ofactuarial feedback effects from social
security reform, many alternative categorizations could be investigated. We
find it useful to categorize first by sector of employment and then by plan
type and benefit design philosophy. This categorization allows us to follow
the various alternative regulatory schemes that govern plan sponsors' re-
porting of expense for retirement programs. The ability to determine ex-
pense implications for various plans may give further insight on sponsor
reactions when we subsequently proceed to outline alternatives for reform
and likely reactions among plan sponsors.
The range of different types of plan sponsors by type includes: public sec-
tor employers; large private sector employers; small private sector employers;
not-for-profit employers; and employers who participate in multiemployer
pension plan arrangements. Different regulatory, accounting, and func-
tional environment factors apply to plan sponsors ofdifferent types and tend
to focus attention on differing measures of pension cost. Furthermore, both
government and private sector sources of data on plan sponsors often focus
only on members of a particular sector or on plans ofa particular variety.2
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Measuring Pension Cost in Different Sectors
Measurement of pension cost is a confusing issue, as evidenced by the multi-
ple and mutually inconsistent measures ofliabilities and costs required for a
private sector defined benefit plan in the current regulatory environment
(McGill et al. 1996). Moreover, the confusion does not stop with private
sector plans. Similar types of cost (e.g., pension costs reported on financial
statements) are inconsistently reported across sectors of employment. Thus
a similar plan and workforce may generate different reported pension ex-
pense if the sponsor is a public-sector rather than a private-sector employer.
Given the wide disparity of cost rules and of their application, there may
be a temptation to dismiss the importance of these inelegant rules to influ-
ence plan sponsor decisions. Unfortunately, these conflicting and confusing
rules have significant implications for the plan sponsors' ability to access
capital markets, to budget and raise cash, and to avoid regulatory costs.
Understanding the rules under which a particular plan sponsor operates
may have significant bearing on the sponsor's likely reaction to proposed
changes in social security.
These differences in cost incidence and determination apply primarily to
defined benefit plans. By contrast, defined contribution plans bring with
them a certain simplicity, in that the cost of a defined contribution plan,
regardless of the entity sponsoring the plan, is almost always equal to the
amount of cash dedicated to funding the plan for that year. Because of the
substantial additional guarantees and subsidies available within their struc-
ture, defined benefit plans present a complex set of rules that vary by entity
type and size as discussed below.
Public sector plans. In the past, governmental plan accounting for defined
benefit plans was typically recorded on a basis equal to the cash contribu-
tion to the plan for the plan year. Contributions were usually based on a
projection of future liabilities and assets, but sometimes ignored certain
promised benefits or even used legislated "rules of thumb." New account-
ing rules that are effective for fiscal periods beginning after June 15, 1997,
require governmental employers to report pension plan expense on the
basis of accruing for all promised benefits, using assumptions and funding
methods appropriate for an ongoing plan (GASB 27 1994). However, for
many plans, it is anticipated that contributions will be equal to the recorded
expense. Most governmental plans use a contribution measure that is antici-
pated to be level over time (usually a level percentage ofcovered salaries; see
PPCC 1996). Many governmental plans have opted out of social security
coverage and so perhaps could be assumed relatively immune to changes in
social security were it not for two issues: (l) the persistent proposals to
include all new public sector employees under social security (Advisory
Council 1997), and (2) the overlap in benefits caused by employees who, by
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changing jobs and employment sector, move in and out of employment
covered by social security.
Large private sector employer plans. Under private sector accounting stan-
dards, pension cost is determined using a projected cost per year of service
concept. Assumptions used to measure cost are a blend of those embedded
in annuity purchase rates and rates based on the likely experience of the
specific plan in question. Cash contributions are determined plimarily
based on expected asset returns of the plan and other assumptions specific
to the plan, subject to the constraints of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) and the Internal Revenue Code. The actual contribu-
tion amounts typically vary significantly from expense reported under the
accounting standards. Most large private sector employers appear to make
decisions regarding plan changes primarily based on the effect on account-
ing cost, rather than the effect on contributions.
Small private sector employer plans. While smaller plivate sector plan spon-
sors are often covered by the accounting and contribution rules that apply
.to larger private sector entities, contribution requirements may have a
greater role in determining changes in benefit policy than accounting rules.
For many smaller entities, particularly those that are not publicly traded,
pension accounting rules are not viewed as particularly relevant or provid-
ing useful information. Contribution requirements are subject to the con-
straints of ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code as for large private sector
plans.
Notfor-profit employer plans. These plans may be governmental entities
(e.g., certain hospitals and colleges), in which GASB rules apply, or may
instead be entities which are subject to private sector accounting constraints
and many of the requirements of ERISA. Particular care is often taken in
this sector to match expense with contributions. Thus, as with small and
governmental plans, contributions are the primary focus on which a deci-
sion is likely to be made.
Multiemployer plans. Sponsors of multiemployer plans are typically a union
or a joint employerlunion association. Under most accounting regimens,
cost is recorded on the books of the employer of the covered participants on
the basis of the required cash contribution (based on a projected view of
liabilities and ERISA constraints). In certain circumstances, where there is
a significant likelihood that an employer might withdraw from a multi-
employer plan, liabilities measured on a plan termination basis may be
required to be reflected on the books of the employer (FASB 87, 1985).
These liabilities are typically measured on the basis of annuity purchase
rates, similar to the basis that applies to the accounting for large private
sector pension plans. As such, they can be significantly affected by short-
term changes in the level of interest rates.
The categorization above reveals a convergence on two views. One is an
accounting paradigm that applies primarily to large private sector entities
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and some small private sector employers and employers that participate in
multiemployer plans. This paradigm is based on a notion of pension cost
per year of service and pension liabilities measured in a way that reflects
some portion of the cost to purchase annuities. This view of cost affects
decisions about changes in pension benefits due to social security reform
for large private sector employers and may affect smaller private sector
employers or participants in multiemployer plans. Most other sponsors will
look primarily at how benefit changes affect current cash contributions. For
defined benefit plans, this second "contribution-based" view will be based
on projected liabilities and best estimates of future asset returns; these con-
tributions are often expressed as a level cost as a percentage of pay. 3
Categorization by Type of Plan
Before proceeding to discuss plan sponsors' reactions to alternative social
security reform proposals, it will also be useful to establish the varieties of
plans and the alternatives for measuring expense under these plans and for
using these plans to affect employee behaviors.
Defined contribution plans. Defined contribution plan design typically fol-
lows one or more of the following design philosophies: the plan functions as
a mechanism for gainsharing, with contributions to accounts tied fairly
directly to profitability or share price (e.g., an Employee Stock Ownership
Plan); the plan provides access to tax deferred savings opportunities (e.g., a
401 (k) plan with no employer matching ofcontributions); the plan is driven
by an employer target for amount of benefit at retirement; or the plan
provides an opportunity to save with direct financial encouragement pro-
vided by the employer (e.g., a plan where the employer matches employee
contributions up to a certain percent). Differences in philosophy regarding
the plan's function and aims may lead plan sponsors to different responses
to changes in social security reforms. For instance, plans that are viewed by
sponsors as gainsharing mechanisms may regard increases or reductions in
social security benefits as not significantly affecting the primary purpose of
the plan, and so make no changes in the plan; but plans driven by target
income replacement will need to reexamine plan design if social security
benefits are changed.
Defined benefit plans. Defined benefit plans have a variety of plan features
allowing the sponsor to affect worker decisions regarding continued em-
ployment versus work with another employer or retirement. These features
include: vesting rules, retirement subsidy provisions, variation in the accrual
of benefit as a function ofservice, etc. By their nature, defined benefit plans
tend to reflect employer targets and an explicit or implicit model of plan-
ning for scheduled retirement and so are likely to be adjusted in response to
changes in the level of benefit provided by social security.
Unfunded non-qualified plans. Common in large private sector employers
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for the top executive group, these plans can be either defined contribution
or defined benefit plans. Of note is the distinction for these plans between
cash flow (contributions) and accrual ofexpense. Furthermore, these plans
do not enjoy the exemption from FICA tax that funded tax qualified plans
do. Participants in these programs are typically earning more than the max-
imum earnings subject to payroll tax for social security benefits. Thus, pn}-
posals to remove the cap on earnings subject to payroll tax (already in effect
for the Medicare portion of taxes) have an effect on the cost of these plans.
Responses of Employer-Sponsored Plans to Alternatives
for Social Security Reform
Having established categories of plan sponsors and reviewed alternative
broad categories of plan design, we ask how these different types of plans
and sponsors would be affected by alternatives for social security reform.
The following section analyses component parts of social security reform
proposals that are incorporated in or have been discussed by various propo-
nents of changes to social security.
Increases in FICA Tax Rates
One proposal for putting social security back into long-range balance would
be through an immediate increase in the payroll tax rate. Alternatively,
rather than collecting increased taxes now, increases in the tax rate could be
deferred and brought into effect as the difference between social security
system revenues and benefit payments narrows.
For a plan sponsor designing a retirement program that is supplemental
to social security, a key design parameter is the target living standard in
retirement provided by the program. This is addressed by examining the
level of replacement ofearnings income needed to provide the same dispos-
able personal income after retirement. This replacement standard changes
in response to marginal income tax rates (Palmer 1994). Since earnings
income is subject to social security payroll taxes, but annuities and invest-
ment income are not, a higher payroll tax reduces the percentage of pre-tax
earnings that the combination of social security, employer pensions and
personal savings must provide. In short, income that was taxed away during
employment need not be replaced in retirement. Hence, even without any
planned increase in social security benefits, an increase in social security tax
rates may lead to declines in the amount of scheduled private pensions, as
pension plan designers react to anticipated lower pre-retirement standards
ofliving. It is likely that some employers will change their pension programs
to realize these savings so as to offset any increase in cost due to increases in
tax rates. Alternatively, employers might recover the cost of increases in
taxes directly, by granting smaller increases in wages than would otherwise
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have been given; the savings due to reduced replacement income would
then serve to reduce the amount of employee savings required in order to
reproduce pre-retirement living standards.
Defined contribution plans. If tax rates are increased, these rate increases
can be expected to raise employer costs and thereby reduce profitability for
private sector employers. But, over time, the tax increases may be antici-
pated to be passed on to employees in lower wage rates or in decreases in
benefits so that total compensation remains constant and profitability is
restored. This scenario assumes that outside constraints (e.g., mandated
wage rules) do not enter into the calculation. Thus for defined contribution
gainsharing plans, social security reform through increased payroll tax rates
appears unlikely to reduce long-term allocations to profit sharing plans.
Gainsharing type plans are also least likely to be viewed by the sponsor as
retirement target arrangements, and so may remain significantly unaffected
by increases in social security payroll tax rates.
However, in defined contribution plans for which a primary function is to
provide employees with access to tax-deferred savings, actual rates of savings
in these plans could well decrease. As higher payroll taxes reduce workers'
take-home pay, people may be less willing and less able to save.
Finally, employers with target benefit plans may be anticipated to revise
the plans to reflect lower saving needed to replace pre-retirement pay.
These revisions are likely to occur over time as sponsors periodically evalu-
ate their total benefit packages, rather than immediately upon the change
in tax rates. Matched savings plans will also be reviewed by plan sponsors in
light of the lower required replacement ratios generated by the new taxes.
Of course, any decrease in propensity or ability to save may generate a need
for proportionately greater matching if employer workforce management
goals are to be met, so that whether employer matching will rise or fall is not
immediately clear. Under the nondiscrimination rules of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, employer responses will be further affected by the need to ensure
that the amount ofincome deferred by non-highly compensated individuals
is sufficiently close to the amount deferred by highly compensated individ-
uals. This last effect could force some employers to reevaluate plan designs
immediately. Hence, if policymakers are to avoid significant disruption
in defined contribution plans at the point of a social security payroll tax
increase, changes in the nondiscrimination rules that apply to employer-
sponsored defined contribution plans must be considered.
Defined benefit plans. Defined benefit programs, by their nature, tend to
target a defined replacement income, and thus reductions in replacement
income required to maintain pre-retirement standards of living will proba-
bly be factored into the design of these plans. However, there will be no
particular urgency to the issue, since anticipated benefit reductions would
be a relatively small percentage of the retirement benefit, and the increase
in payroll tax does not, of itself, require amendment of the pension plan.
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Hence, any changes would probably be accomplished as a part of a periodic
benefit program review, rather than immediately upon the change in rates.
Many defined benefit plans require routine updating to keep benefit levels
in line with increases in pay levels; for these plans, the change to reflect
lower replacement ratios could readily take the form of delaying updates to
the plan formula. Benefit cost decreases under the reform are likely to
spread over an extended period, for both projected contribution amounts
and accounting costs.
Increases in Social Security Taxable Earnings Base
Another alternative for reforming the social security program would be to
remove the cap on earnings subject to tax and to instead subject all earnings
to tax (as in the Medicare Hospital Insurance program). This would en-
gender some additional level of social security benefits, but, due to the
highly progressive social security benefit formula, the cost to social security
of increased benefits would be more than offset by increased tax collections.
As with tax-rate increase proposals, an increase in the maximum amount
of taxable earnings would reduce the replacement ratios required to main-
tain pre-retirement standards of living. The decrease in the \'equired re-
placement ratio would only apply to higher paid individuals, since the de-
crease in pre-retirement disposable income applies only to income expected
to exceed the projected pre-retirement maximum taxable earnings base
under current law. Hence, one might anticipate that retirement plan de-
signers would decrease marginal replacement ratios as income increases.
A review of the regulatory structure that governs many employer-
sponsored plans confirms the likelihood ofand suggests some immediacy to
changes that reduce the relative retirement income replacement ratios for
higher paid individuals. Rules designed to prevent private pension plans
from unduly favoring highly paid individuals apply to private sector (and
most not-for-profit) organizations. These rules are often complied with, to
some extent, by public sector entities. Under these rules, allowance is made
for the provision ofgreater benefits to highly paid individuals due to the fact
that social security taxes are only assessed on earnings up to (and social
security benefits are only calculated based on) the maximum social security
taxable earnings. In essence, for defined contribution plans, the current
configuration of the rules recognizes the employer portion of the OASDI
social security tax as equivalent to a pension contribution; employers are
effectively allowed to continue that level of contribution to a defined contri-
bution plan, providing that certain other rules are met.4 Rules with compa-
rable intent (but greater complexity) apply to defined benefit pension
plans, providing for a level of "permitted disparity" in the provision of
benefits to higher-paid individuals. It is anticipated that these special ex-
emptions for anticipated disparity would be eliminated if the underlying
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feature of social security (i.e., the cap on taxable earnings) is removed.
Complete data on the extent to which current plan designs rely on permit-
ted disparity to pass nondiscrimination tests are not available (particularly
since plans need not explicitly adjust benefit levels to integrate with social
security to rely on permitted disparity), but clearly it characterizes a major-
ity ofthe defined benefit plan universe (Olsen et al. 1977).
An initial reaction to the combination of a decrease in marginal required
replacement ratios and the elimination of permitted disparity may be to
assume that the two offset. But, barring a restructuring of the benefit plan,
elimination of permitted disparity would increase benefits provided to all
employees on earnings less than the social security earnings base, including
employees earning less than the earnings base for whom no change in
required income replacement has occurred. If the pension plan is restruc-
tured to bring benefits for lower-paid individuals back to the same levels as
in effect before the elimination of permitted disparity, the reduction in the
combined social security and private pension benefit for higher-paid indi-
viduals will exceed the reduction generated in the required replacement
rate. This is due to the progressive nature of the social security benefit
calculation. For the most highly paid individuals, this effect is further exac-
erbated by the cap on pensionable wages that can be used in determining
benefits under qualified (funded) pension plans. This cap, which genel-ally
may be assumed to apply to many of the individuals at a plan sponsor with
ultimate authority to approve changes in plan design, may force an em-
ployer with relatively egalitarian retirement income provisions to design a
separate plan solely for the provision of benefits to the highly paid. Such a
nonqualified plan would likely be at least technically unfunded, and cannot
cover a broad spectrum of employees. These plans, covering only a few
decisionmakers, are of course inexpensive when compared with costs of
providing benefits to all employees. Given the cost incentives to rework
plans if permitted disparity is eliminated, it is likely that employers will
respond quickly to amend plans in the event that payroll taxes are applied to
all earnings. It would not be surprising if increasing numbers of employers
shifted primarily to nonqualified plans for senior executives and reduced
the employer role in the provision of pensions for other workers.
Reductions in Social Security Cost of Living Adjustments (COLA)
Other proposals to reform social security have focused on benefit decreases
rather than tax increases. Among these are proposals to reduce the indexa-
tion of the benefit by indexing to the Consumer Price Index minus some
arbitrary fraction (e.g., CPI - 0.5%). Alternatively, only a portion of the
benefit might be indexed (e.g., only the benefit up to the poverty level, or
only the amount of benefit received up to the median benefit level).
For sponsors reviewing replacement ratios, a reduction in social security
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benefits leads to an increase in the amount that must be provided by em-
ployer or employee monies in order to maintain pre-retirement living stan-
dards in retirement. However, any widespread change in the indexation of
social security benefits may be anticipated to lead to rethinking of what it
means to provide a pre-retirement standard of living in retirement. Clearly,
the individuals' circumstances change during retirement, and the mainte-
nance of the pre-retirement living standard is unlikely to be exact even at
the point of retirement. Will employers change the planning basis to one of
maintenance of the level of real disposable income at retirement? Will em-
ployees show increased interest in indexed annuities or the ability to man-
age assets (and so explicitly take steps to guard against inflation risk)? Cost
implications of this type of policy change would only apply as plans are
amended, for most of the categOlies of plans and sponsors that we have
discussed. Thus, changes to reflect these considerations are likely to occur
on a gradual basis without significant immediate disruption of the employer
plan arena.
Public sector defined benefit plans. While the implications of a reduction in
COLA are likely to be reflected relatively slowly for most types of plans,
special considerations may apply to public sector plans. Indexed retirement
benefits are much more prevalent in these plans (PPCC 1996), and immedi-
ate taxpayer pressure on benefits may be anticipated, if indexation of public
sector pensions is more generous than for social security benefits.
Means Testing of Social Security Benefits
Means testing proposals call for curtailing or taxing away social security
benefits for those with incomes or assets exceeding certain levels. Clearly a
means test would represent a tax on income from savings that, while per-
haps not quite a "cliff," certainly presents a very sharp incline.
As with other reductions in social security benefits, a means test increases
the amount of retirement income that must come from employer and em-
ployee funds to maintain a specified pre-retirement living standard, for the
individuals whose benefits will be affected. However, the actual mechanism
by which means testing is affected may significantly modify choices about
ways to provide retirement income. For instance, means testing might codify
a preference for stable (annuity) income by establishing rules that favor
annuities compared to asset pools that yield investment income.
Furthermore, the steepness of the implied tax on savings may tend to
accelerate any trend to provide sharply different benefits for decision-
makers (assumed likely to be subject to any means test) versus rank-and-file
employees. Thus, means testing may further increase the number of non-
qualified plans that provide retirement benefits only for the top echelon of
employees. Other employees may be covered under a plan that (in conjunc-
tion with benefits calculated under social security) provides adequate in-
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come to the lowest paid and fails to replicate pre-retirement living standards
for employees in the middle earning ranges.
Increases in Retirement Age
A number of reform advocates have recently suggested a partial solution to
the social security system's problems by raising the age at which unreduced
social security benefits are paid. Proposals include increasing the normal
retirement age to age 70, or indexing it to increases in longevity. Other
proposals would change the age at which early retirement benefits are first
paid.
Changes to the age of retirement clearly affect the underlying basis of
planning for retirement by plan sponsors, in that most plans, regardless of
sector of employment, feature an accumulation of capital or of retirement
benefits. If the date of commencement is to be delayed, then the accumula-
tion per year can safely be reduced. But the retirement age for social se-
curity benefits is not necessarily closely linked to retirement ages used by
plan sponsors in designing retirement plans for their own employees. In-
stead, employer retirement planning models typically reflect employer per-
ceptions of workforce needs. To the extent that the social security retire-
ment age proposals reflect the actual availability of an active, productive
older workforce, employers may be expected to respond to the same trends
in worker productivity by raising pension plan retirement ages in tandem
with social security. But, to date, employers continue to sponsor early retire-
ment incentives in defined benefit plans that encourage retirement well
before the age of earliest retirement under social security, even as increases
in social security normal retirement age are scheduled to begin under exist-
ing law.
Defined benefit plans. Certain defined benefit plans integrate early retire-
ment benefits very closely with social security through the use of supple-
mental retirement benefits that are payable until social security retirement
age (either early or normal) is reached. Under these plans, an increase in
social security retirement age could serve to extend the duration of these
supplemental retirement benefits. Thus, an increase in the age of normal or
early retirement under social security could have severe cost implications
for these plans, leading sponsors of the plans to immediately revisit the
plan design.
Invest Social Security Trust Assets in Private (Domestic) Equities
Recent proposals have advocated investing some of the social security trust
funds in equity investments. Under this model, the government would pas-
sively purchase domestic securities, presumably through index funds. In-
creases in the funds available for investments in domestic equity securities
344 An Actuarial Perspective on Social Security Reform
would potentially be significant, raising questions about the degree of gov-
ernmental control of private equity, the leveraging of passively held index
investments, and the power of entrenched management. If the federal defi-
cit is no longer partially financed by the excess of social security taxes over
benefit payments, there may be effects on interest rates as well.5
The proposal would appear likely to increase short-term demand for equi-
ties and so raise values of current equity investments. However, interest
rates or taxes might also rise as the federal government financed (or re-
duced) the deficit by raising additional monies. In balanced portfolios, the
effect of rising interest rates on bond prices would tend to offset gains due to
additional demand for equities. Over the longer term, there remain unan-
swered questions about the equilibrium of interest rates versus returns on
equities.
Defined contribution plans. In and of itself, this reform does not change the
underlying benefit structure of the social security program and so would
not necessarily induce demand-driven changes in defined contribution
plans. However, to the extent that long-term rates of return are increased
or decreased, changes in contribution rates may be required to assure
adequate retirement income under the new investment paradigm. Such
changes are likely to be very slow, as investors and plan sponsors first wait for
data to verify the change in investment returns and then modify plans as
part of a review of total benefi t packages.
Large private sector defined benefit plans. A narrowing of the spread between
equity returns and bond interest rates may have little effect on portfolios
and therefore on the long-term contribution requirements and returns of
most defined benefit plans. However, for plans governed by private sector
accounting rules, there can be a significant effect on reported cost. For
these plans, liabilities are determined on the basis of a mixture of annuity
purchase rate assumptions and of assumptions germane to anticipated plan
experience. In essence, this forces the determination of liabilities using a
discount rate equal to a long bond interest rate, rather than discounting at
the anticipated rate of return on the investments. The net effect is to set a
pattern of high costs for immature plans, followed by low or even negative
costs as the plan matures. A decrease in the spread between equity rates of
return and long bond interest rates would decrease this effect over the long
term. However, over the near term, large private sector plans would proba-
bly see significant reductions in reported pension expense, if the interest
rate used to determine expense were to rise.
Privatization in IRA-Like Accounts
Some analysts propose to reserve a portion of social security taxes, or in-
crease taxes, to fund investment in individual defined contribution social
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security accounts. These accounts would serve as mandatory IRA-type in-
vestments. Through the individual account mechanism, the issue ofgovern-
ment investment in private sector equities is to some extent finessed, al-
though the issue of replacing a significant source offunds for current deficit
financing remains.
The proposed reform shares many features with the proposal to invest
social security trust fund assets in equities. It would likely have a similar
effect on short-term demand for equities and on interest rates. Identical
questions arise about shifts in the long-term equilibrium of interest rates vs.
returns on equities. The added item of interest is the clear similarity be-
tween the privatized accounts and existing defined contribution plans. At
least one proposal (CED 1997) has argued that plan sponsors might directly
credit defined contribution plan allocations against the new privatized ac-
counts, so long as the accounts meet certain restrictions. By allowing em-
ployers to credit contributions directly to existing defined contribution
plans against the new taxes, net savings in the economy are not increased
with respect to employees of employers that sponsor existing plans. It is
possible, although speculative, that employers who do not currently offer
defined contribution plans might be encouraged to offer such a plan as an
addition to the required mandatory IRA account. Another concern regard-
ing these accounts is that employers might be forced to step in and increase
benefits if returns are poor. However, the similarity of mandatory IRA ac-
counts to current defined contribution plans argues that this risk is no
different from that already borne by employers whose retirement programs
include a combination of defined contribution and defined benefit plans.
The proposal also shares many features with an increase in social security
tax rates. However, in addition to the reduction in required replacement
ratios as a result of lowered pre-retirement disposable income, mandatory
IRA's may be anticipated to generate additional benefits. Thus, the resulting
reduction in employer-provided benefits is likely to be much more signifi-
cant than for the payroll tax increase alone. For employers with both a
defined contribution and a defined benefit plan, this reaches its logical
conclusion in the proposal to directly offset defined contribution plan con-
tributions against mandatory IRA contributions.
Conclusion
The degree to which social security reforms determine changes in employer-
sponsored retirement plans will depend on the regulatory environment and
the desire of plan sponsors to affect retirement decisions of their own work-
force. Preliminary analysis indicates that increases in social security tax rates
are most likely to affect defined contribution plans, due to the interaction of
decreased ability to save by lower-paid individuals with the nondiscrimina-
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tion rules for defined contribution plans. The immediate effect may be
limited, however, for plans that are not currently close to failing these tests.
The effect of removing the limit on earnings subject to payroll taxes would
be to require immediate redesign of the majority of private sector, defined
benefit plans (and presumably some defined contribution plans as well).
This is due to the anticipated elimination of permitted disparity rules at the
time the cap on taxable earnings is removed. In conjunction with the pro-
gressive nature ofthe determination of the social security benefit, this could
accelerate the trend to a two-tier system of unfunded pension plans for the
top-paid group, and a funded plan which is adequate for the lower-paid and
inadequate for employees in the middle.
Increases in retirement ages are anticipated to have long-term design
implications for sponsored plans; short-term cost increases may be limited
to plans that provide early retirement supplements. Similarly, reductions in
social security cost-of-living adjustments appear to affect the plan sponsor
retirement system gradually, save for the potential for more rapid changes to
indexation provisions of public sector plans. Means testing raises many un-
answered actuarial issues and could require large and immediate changes in
sponsored retirement plans.
Proposals to change the investment policy pursued by the Social Security
Administration affect not only benefit design costs but also near-term finan-
cial cost drivers, particularly for large private sector plans. These changes
could generate large reductions in reported pension (and retiree medical)
costs. Longer-term increases in sponsor cost would emerge if this policy
were to decrease long-term returns in equity investments. The establish-
ment of mandatory IRA-type accounts would argue for similar effects on
markets, but also puts participant benefits at risk if equity markets fail to
perform. This adds additional risk that employers will need to increase
benefits in a future market downturn, but not to any greater extent than
that currently faced by sponsors who rely on a combination of defined
contribution and defined benefit plans in designing a retirement program.
Ifwe are to derive a retirement income security policy for all individuals, it
is imperative that social security reforms be evaluated not solely for their
effects on social security benefits, but also with respect to their effects on
employer-sponsored retirement plans, and the desire and ability of em-
ployees to save on their own behalf. This chapter uses a preliminary assign-
ment of plans into categories by sector ofemployment and by type of plan to
allow better understanding of the cost drivers and the benefit models under-
lying plan sponsors' reactions to different reform proposals. Use of similar
methodology with alternate methods of categorizing plans (e.g., collectively
bargained status) may lead to additional insights and should be pursued.
Finally, all proposals put forward to date use a combination of the types of
social security reforms discussed; applying the above type of analysis to
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actual proposals would require careful evaluation of the interaction of the
various reforms.
Notes
1. For areas of relative actuarial agreement with respect to the effects of social
security reform proposals on the social security program, see the monograph series
on various reform issues produced by the American Academy ofActuaries.
2. A discussion ofemployer data sources useful in policy modeling appears in Citro
and Hanushek (1997).
3. Placing employers in categories is at best approximate, and meant to describe
the regulatory paradigm that receives primary focus. Certain sponsors within a sec-
tor may behave more like sponsors within other sectors because of business circum-
stances such as regulatory environment. For instance, many utilities once focused
primarily on cash contribution requirements, as do smaller private firms, because of
the importance of regulatory accounting rules (FASB 71,1982).
4. These additional rules include a restriction that the rate of employer contribu-
tion for monies contributed to a plan based on compensation in excess of social
security Earnings Base be no more than double the rate of contribution to the plan
due to compensation up to the social security Earnings Base. Rules on nondiscrimi-
nation testing are contained in Sections 401, 410 and 414 of the Internal Revenue
Code and the various regulations provided under the authority of these sections.
Specific rules regarding the ability to integrate employer plans with the provisions of
social security are included in Sections 401 (a) (5) and 401 (l).
5. Of course, as the excess of social security taxes over benefit payments is antici-
pated to become zero and then turn negative over time, the loss of this source of
deficit financing is inevitable.
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